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This paper contributes to the management debate regarding the gap between intended 
corporate strategy and operational reality by examining the relationships between 
senior executives and line managers within the multiple store retail industry.  Using a 
case study methodology, and an Agency theoretical perspective, the research 
investigates the implementation of two operational policies designed to achieve 
corporate strategy - employment and supplier relationship policies.  The findings note 
that the incentives offered in the principal-agent relationship drove the behaviour of 
line managers.  Managers sought to maximise their rewards by focusing efforts on 
surrogate measures designed to evaluate performance. The research concludes that 
organisational long run considerations are counteracted by reward systems for 
employees that encourage behaviour that focuses on short run sales and earnings at 




The management literature has long been concerned with the gap that can arise 
between organisational policy prescriptions designed to achieve corporate strategy, 
and operational reality (Cunningham et al 2004).  In addition, as the focus of 
contemporary management research moves beyond the firm to examine relationships 
between firms, any mismatch between corporate strategy and actual policy execution 
has much wider implications, particularly for other firms within the supply chain.  As 
a result, the activities of managers, what they do and why they do it, is increasingly 
becoming central to the strategy debate (Johnson et al 2003).  Against such a 
background, this paper uses Agency theory to discuss corporate strategy and the 
execution of human resource management (HRM) and supply chain management 
(SCM) within the context of multiple store retailing.  It sets out to make a contribution 
in key areas of the debate surrounding organisational policies, strategic outcomes and 
managerial activity by examining two characteristically difficult agency relationships 
between senior executives who determine operational policies designed to achieve 
corporate strategy, and those who implement them.  Specifically, by examining 
employment and supplier policies within the context of the UK retail industry, the 
paper adopts both an inter-firm level of analysis through examining the relationships 
between buyers and suppliers between firms and an intra-firm perspective by 
examining relationships between senior executives and the line managers responsible 
for implementation of policies within firms, namely human resource management 
(HRM) policies.   
 
The paper answers the call from strategy-as-practice researchers to examine the 
activities of individuals on which key processes and practices depend, particularly 
those at the periphery (Johnson et al 2003).  The focus on HRM can be justified 
because line managers within retail stores have a high level of responsibility for 
managing employees (Sparks 2000).  Centralisation has directly removed many other 
areas of decision-making responsibility, while at the same time senior executives have 
been found to be increasingly devolving responsibility for HRM to store level using 
line managers (Tomlinson et al 1997).  As a result, one focus of HRM research has 
been on the tensions between espoused and actual employment policies relating to the 
management of people within an organisation (Hall and Torrington 1998;  
Marchington and Parker 1990).  Agency theory can be used here to examine the 
process of delegation of HRM to line managers, which can help to ascertain why the 
tensions reported in the literature exist. 
 
Individual relationships are also a crucial element of a competitive strategy that views 
the whole supply chain rather than the individual firm as the source of competitive 
advantage (Christopher, 2004). Supply Chain Management (SCM) notes that it is the 
management of processes across firms rather than the management of functional 
activities within firms that delivers success for all participants. In particular, the 
relationship between buyers and sellers is identified in the supply chain literature as 
an area of tension between espoused policy and actual behaviour (for a review, see 
Harland, Knight and Cousins, 2004) in the same way as the tensions outlined above 
with the execution of HRM policy. However, the literature adopts a macro approach, 
and does not examine the day-to-day activities of individuals that impact upon 
strategic outcomes. This paper addresses these shortcomings by discovering the 
results of buyer behaviour on suppliers,  and identifies the conflicting incentives 
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driving buyer behaviour, thus ensuring discrepancies between the formulation of 
supply chain strategy and the successful execution of supplier relationship policies.  
 
Given the increasing demands for interdisciplinary approaches to management 
problems, this paper applies economics to the areas of SCM and HRM in order to 
provide insights into a variety of phenomenon that otherwise seem difficult to explain 
or even paradoxical (Gunderson 2001).   The paper presents data that explore the 
agency relationships between senior executives who formulate policy, and managerial 
execution of HRM and SCM policies.  Such a level of analysis has been previously 
neglected by agency researchers who are traditionally interested in higher level 
relationships, ie between suppliers of capital and senior executives of publically 
quoted companies (Thompson 1988; Eisenhardt 1989; Bergen et al, 1992).   This 
paper confirms that discrepancies exist between devised corporate policies and their 
implementation at both the inter-firm and intra-firm level.  It goes on to suggest 
reasons for these variations and outlines the consequences of these discrepancies for 
both within the firm and along the supply chain.  The results contribute to the 
theoretical debate on agency relationships on both an intra and inter-firm level and 
offers practical solutions for practitioners in order to ensure that operational policies 
are enacted.  
 
The paper begins with a review of Agency theory within the context of human 
resource management and supply chain management.  The methodology is then 
presented and justified, followed by the findings at both the inter-firm and intra-firm 
level.  The final section concludes with a discussion of the implications, some 
practical recommendations, a summary of the contribution to theory, limitations and 
opportunities for further research.  
 
2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Agency theory is concerned with situations in which one party, namely the principal, 
requires a second party, namely the agent, to undertake an action on the principal’s 
behalf. The focus of the theory is on determining the most efficient contract given the 
risk and effort characteristics of the principal and agent, information asymmetry and 
environmental uncertainty (Eisenhardt 1989). In the absence of perfect information, 
principals are unable to closely observe the actions of their agents, and self interest on 
the part of agents will make them reluctant to share that information with the 
principal. Without perfect information the principal assumes that the agent will shirk, 
termed moral hazard (Eisenhardt 1989).  To counteract this, the theoretical choice has 
traditionally been between outcome-based contracts and behaviour-based contracts.   
 
Outcome-based contracts rewar d agents on the basis of realised pre-specified 
performance outcomes such as sales, output and profit (Bergen et al. 1992) .  Such 
contracts can be likened to Ouchi’s (1977) output control systems or Merchant’s 
results control (1985.  Ouchi’s output control model focuses on systems of planning 
and control whereby the work itself cannot be specified so the results, not the process 
are standardised.  As a result, performance control systems express results in specific 
objectives or quantitativ e measures though which the formal goals of the organisation 
are directly operationalised.  Merchant (1985:4) describes this method as results 
control referring to an approach which holds individuals responsible for achieving 
particular results and then rewarding them for their achievement.  In doing so it 
allows the possibility of managers having autonomy for detailed action, provided they 
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can produce the desired outcome and therefore outcomes must be quantifiable.  As 
Lusch and Jaworski (1991) commented, retail management tends to have an 
overriding concern with bottom-line performances, which makes the use of output 
control widespread in retail settings.  Outcome-based contracts gives agents autonomy 
over detailed action, provided they produce the desired outcomes; therefore outcomes 
must be easy to observe and measure. If a principal cannot accurately measure either 
the desired action or outcome, surrogate measures may be used instead, and this may 
lead to distorted behaviour from an agent if the surrogate measure is not highly 
correlated to the desired measure. Agents will seek to maximise their rewards by 
focusing all efforts on the surrogate measures that are being used to evaluate 
performance. An important conclusion, therefore, is that the incentives offered in a 
principal-agent relationship will drive the behaviour of the agent (Kerr, 1975; 
Besanko et al. 1996; Gibbons 1998) .  According to Eisenhardt (1989), outcome-based 
contracts are the preferred option for risk averse principals, risk neutral agents, 
outcomes which are easily measured, and low goal conflict between principal and 
agent. 
 
The alternative choice in Agency theory is to use behaviour-based contracts which 
attempt to reward the agent on the basis of information about actual behaviour.  As 
not all aspects of performance can be measured in quantitative terms, output control 
can be difficult and behaviour-based contracts might be used.  Here, the principal can 
invest resources, typically management information systems, which will increase 
information on the agent’s actions, but this information may in itself be an imperfect 
estimator. However, the motivational role of monitoring is highlighted by Weiss 
(1995) who argues that this indirect incentive for greater economic efficiency should 
not be ignored. As a result, opportunistic behaviour of the agent can theoretically be 
restricted and the objectives of the principal maximised.  Behaviour-based contracts 
of Agency theory can be likened to Mintzberg’s personal control systems (1983) or 
Merchant’s social control system (1985).   Here the actions required can be specified 
so that the control system is geared towards seeing that the correct actions are carried 
out.  This can be achieved through the formalisation of work content via rules, 
procedures and job descriptions.  Merchant (1985) concluded that it is with 
organisational functions where it is difficult to define and measure outputs and where 
it is not entirely clear what procedures are required that social controls are more 
important.  However, both Mintzberg and Merchant concluded that where many 
organisations place the emphasis on rewarding results and not behaviour, managerial 
behaviour becomes geared towards the achievement of reported results.  A 
comparison of agency and management theories of control is made in Figure One.  
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According to Eisenhardt (1989), behaviour-based contracts are preferred given 
available information systems, low span of control, high outcome uncertainty, and 
long relationships between principal and agent built over time.  In addition, 
behaviour-based contracts will be preferred if the appropriate behaviour required of 
the agent can be readily specified in advance.  Highly programmed tasks more easily 
reveal agent behaviour because they ar e easier to observe and evaluate.  
 
Researchers have called for Agency theory to be extended beyond the economics 
perspective in order to include real world problems of co-operative effort, and have 
criticised the theoretical choice between outcome-based or behaviour-based contracts 
(Eisenhardt 1988).  Few researchers have actively applied and extended Agency 
theory to examine organisational behaviour (Mitnick 1992).  The theory has been 
criticised for its static focus on single time periods and rewards, its reliance on 
secondary data to test agency-based propositions (Bergen et al 1992), the focus on 
objective rather than subjective monitoring, incentives which are couched only in 
monetary terms (Arrow 1985; Shaw and Gibbs 1995), and the assumptions regarding 
the risk preferences of principal and agent. Hendry (1997) questions the assumption 
that outcomes can be specified accurately to an agent.  Agency theory is only 
concerned with contractual arrangements between the dyad, and does not take account 
of the multi-dyadic arrangements along a supply chain, and the impact of contractual 
relationships between one dyad and another. 
 
Previous analysis of agency relationships has paid little attention to how managers 
implement corporate strategy at the micro level of organisations and have instead 
concentrated only on the macro level of organisational relationships.  In addition, the 
call to move away from examining strategy at the macro-level of the organisation to 
examining the day-to-day activities of organisational life and their relation to strategic 
outcomes (Johnson et al 2003) can be answered by looking at the activities of 
managers within organisations.  In answer to the weaknesses of Agency theory and 
these calls for micro-level analysis of both strategy implementation and Agency 
theory, this paper focuses on the role of line managers and buyers as key linkages in 
the execution of employment and supplier policies. 
 
2.1 Intra-firm Agency relationships: Human Resource Management 
The notion of human resource management is used in this paper to refer to all those 
activities associated with the management of employment relationships in the firm.  
Two of the most widely adopted models of HRM are the hard and soft versions (Truss 
et al 1997).  Guest (1987) and Storey (1992) viewed the distinction between soft and 
hard models of HRM as whether the emphasis is placed on the human or the resource.  
Hard HRM stresses the “the quantitative, calculative and business-strategic aspects of 
managing the headcounts resource in as ‘rational’ a way as for any other economic 
factor” (Storey, 1989: 8).  Meanwhile, soft HRM is associated with the concept of 
employee commitment based on high levels of trust and associated with goals of 
flexibility and adaptability that “emphasise communication, motivation and 
leadership” (Storey, 1989:8). 
 
The link between strategy and HRM is a key feature of HRM that is regarded by some 
as essential to the model of HRM.  However, there is debate in the literature about 
how HRM should be linked to corporate strategy and the link between this and 
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organisational performance.  Much of the literature to date has concentrated on 
strategy and performance, the two end points of evaluation (for example, Huselid 
1995; MacDuffie 1995; Miles and Snow 1994; Patterson et al 1997; Pfeffer 1994). 
While helping to stage how HRM practices can lead to desired outcomes at a macro 
level, it does not address the processes through which this occurs at a micro level.  
This can be achieved by looking at the variables that mediate HRM strategy and 
organisational performance and is an area where theory building is currently scarce 
(Bowen and Ostroff 2004; Naumann and Bennett 2000).   
 
One of the variables between human resource (HR) strategy and performance is the 
role of line managers and their implementation of HR policies.  Models of HRM 
commonly emphasise the critical role of line managers in the effective delivery of 
HRM strategy (for example Storey 1992:7).  Line managers are typically given 
responsibility for translating plans and policies into action and as such are main 
players in the implementation stage of the strategy process.  This increased role of 
line managers in the management of human resources is a distinctive characteristic of 
HRM (see Legge 1995; Renwick 2000) and highlights the vital role line managers 
play as agents in the execution of HR strategy.  In the retail industry there is evidence 
of an increasing devolution of responsibility for HRM to store level (Sparks 2000) 
and as a result many HRM decisions are not taken by HR specialists, but instead by 
line managers.  This adds significance to the role of line managers as key linkages in 
HRM systems and supports the assertion that line managers are fundamental to 
sustaining the link between corporate strategy, HRM strategy and organisational 
performance.  Consequently, HRM is an appropriate line management functional 
responsibility to examine for the intra-firm analysis perspective of this paper. 
 
Within Agency theory, the contract is seen as a metaphor to describe a situation in 
which one party delegates work to another (Jenson and Mecklin 1976).  With line 
managers in multiple retailing taking large responsibility for the implementation of 
HRM, Agency theory can be used to depict this process of delegation of HRM from 
head office to line managers in retail stores.  It can be used to examine the 
relationship between HR strategy makers at head office as principals and line 
managers as the implementers and hence the agents.  
 
 
2.2 Inter-firm Agency Relationships: Supply Chain Management 
This paper adopts the view that supply chain management (SCM) is a management 
philosophy concerned with the management of supply and demand across traditional 
boundaries – functional, organisational and relational – and recognises that by doing 
so, organisations will gain commercial benefits (New 1997).   Within the retail supply 
chain, relationships with suppliers are critical and most multiple store retailers adopt a 
supplier relationship policy.   For one industry, supplier relationships are governed by 
a code of practice imposed by the Competition Commission. A code of practice 
applicable to the major UK supermarkets was introduced in March 2002 following a 
Competition Commission inquiry into the competitiveness of the industry. This 
followed allegations from suppliers during the course of the inquiry about the 
behaviour of the supermarkets in the course of their trading relationships.  The Code 
governs most aspects of the trading relationship, including selection of suppliers, 
contract conditions, terms of payment, charges to suppliers, communication, retail 
prices, confidentiality and dispute resolution.  In February 2004, following a review 
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of the Code of Practice, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) noted that most suppliers 
believed that the Code had not brought about any change in the behaviour of the 
supermarkets (OFT 2004).  Subsequent research (Duffy, Fearne and Hornibrook, 
2003; Fearne, Duffy and Hornibrook, 2005) has also presented strong empirical 
evidence from suppliers, who perceive that the introduction of the Code of Practice 
has not impacted upon the behaviour of supermarkets towards them, even though the 
major supermarkets have introduced tailored training programmes for buyers. Buyer 
behaviour was identified by suppliers as a major issue in the development of 
relationships within the supply chain.  The role of the retail buyer in delivering a 
supplier relationship policy is therefore crucial in the achievement of strategic 
objectives.  The contractual relationship can be viewed as being between senior 
executives as principals, and retail buyers as agents, responsible for the 
implementation of a supplier relationship policy.  
 
Agency theory can be used here to examine the relationship between Supply Chain 
Management strategy makers at head office as principals, and Buyers as the 
implementers and hence the agents. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
 
A case study approach was adopted to examine the complex social events 
underpinning Agency theory both between firms and within firms.  The case study 
research strategy is identified as being the most appropriate when examining ‘how’ or 
‘why’ research questions; when the researcher has little control over events, and when 
examining contemporary phenomena. The focus of case study research is to enhance 
understanding and to gain insight, and is often exploratory, explanatory, or 
descriptive. Case study research can consist of either qualitative or quantitative data, 
or both, incorporating multiple data collection methods including archived material, 
interviews, questionnaires and observations (Eisenhardt, 1989).   Yin (1989) proposes 
that the major advantage of using a case study approach, compared to other research 
strategies, is that it yields opportunities to use many different sources of evidence, and 
that most of the better case studies rely on a wide variety of sources.  By using 
multiple sources of evidence to examine the same phenomenon, triangulation occurs, 
improving the validity of the research and minimising problems associated with 
construct validity1. 
 
Cases are not representative samples of a population, but have more in common with 
experiments, which are generalisable to theoretical propositions but not to 
populations or universes (Yin, 1989). Various authors (Sterns, Schweikhardt and 
Peterson, 1998;  Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Ghauri, Gronhaug and 
Kristianslund, 1995) propose that the case study method is the preferred strategy 
when researching relatively less-known areas, where there is little prior experience 
and available theory to serve as a guide.  Given that this research needed to 
investigate complex social phenomenon surrounding the implementation of corporate 
strategy, a case study approach is more appropriate (Yin 1994).   
 
                                        
1 Ensuring correct operational measures for the concepts being studied (Yin, 1989). 
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The following sections outline the methods deplo yed for both the inter -firm and intra-
firm research for this paper.  
 
3.1 Intra-firm Methods 
To increase the validity of data collected, a multiple case study design was adopted to 
examine intra-firm relationships between principals and agents.  Three mult iple store 
retail organisations were used as case studies.  An embedded approach to the case 
study design was used, with the embedded units being retail stores.  Two embedded 
units for each case study organisation were chosen to enable comparability between 
stores within the same case study.  This use of two embedded units would also help to 
reduce the risk of bias or ‘unique’ stores distorting the findings while increasing 
validity by using replication in collecting data from a greater number of similar 
sources.  All six stores were located across Southern England to restrict the 
geographical dispersion of embedded units again improving validity by minimising 
the affect of local market conditions.  The individual stores were selected on the 
grounds of ensur ing a representative mix of store types for each case study 
organisation.  
 
Semi-structured interviews with a pre-selected sample of employees together with a 
review of company documentation were the main methods of data collection in each 
of the case studies.  Given that the research objectives required a focus on the 
operational level of retail organisations, managers at the embedded units became the 
focus of the fieldwork research process.  However, it was also considered important 
to understand the role of corporate strategy and organisational policy which 
necessitated interviews with senior managers at head office or regional office level.  
At least one interview with each line manager at the embedded units (the stores), 
together with supporting interviews with managers at head office or regional office 
was considered a suitable research sample.  In total, a series of sixty two interviews 
were conducted over a twelve month period with each interview taking between 40 
and 90 minutes.  Table 1 outlines the sample characteristics of the interviewees.  All 
interviews were one-to-one with no other persons present to ensure confidentiality 
and improve validity of the responses given by the interviewee.   
 
Table 1: Interview Sample (Intra-firm analysis) 
 








   Store A Store B  
Superco 2 1 12 12 27 
Groceryco 1 1 9 10 21 
Homeco 2 1 5 6 14 
TOTAL 5 3 26 28 62 
 
 
3.2 Inter-firm Methods 
The growth of the major UK supermarkets has also impacted upon their supply base, 
as they now deal with just a handful of large pre-packers or processors in each 
product area.  
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A series of twenty semi-structured interviews with a sample of key direct and indirect 
main suppliers to the major supermarkets in the main commodity sectors (i.e. lamb, 
beef, pork, apples and pears, potatoes, liquid milk and cheese). The aim of the 
interviews was to identify suppliers’ perceptions of supermarket buyers’ behaviour. 
The interviews were conducted over a period of six weeks in May and June 2002 and 
were all taped to ensure that the information gained in the interviews was recorded 
accurately. Some suppliers expressed some concern over this, owing to the sensitive 
nature of the questions, but were assured complete anonymity by the researchers. For 
this reason, the identities of individuals and organisations have not been revealed 
(Duffy, Fearne and Hornibrook, 2003). 
This qualitative methodology was followed by a postal survey of commodity 
suppliers, resulting in a total of one hundred and forty useable questionnaires, 




4.1 Intra-firm research: Human Resource Management  
The case study research found widespread devolution of HRM responsibility from 
Head Office to line managers2 in the three retail organisations, highlighting the 
significance of line managers as key agents in HRM systems.  This supports the 
contention that line managers are fundamental to sustaining the link between 
corporate strategy, HRM and performance, corroborating Johnson et al’s (2003) call 
for research efforts to be focused at the micro level of organisations.   
 
Using the agency perspective, there was an emphasis on outcome-based contracts to 
manage the principal-agent relationship in each of the case study firms.  Head Office 
devised strategies and policies and imposed requisite budgets and performance targets 
onto stores where responsibility for meeting those targets rested largely with line 
managers.  Performance measurement centred on quantifiable targets and focused on 
budget control systems to ensure cost minimisation, which was a key focus of each 
organisation’s corporate strategy: 
 
“The company has become more ruthless….they are forever devising new 
ways to cut costs” (Department Manager, Superco) 
 
“The company is now more demanding.  There are less staffing hours for each 
department so greater efficiencies need to be achieved “(Department Manager, 
Groceryco)  
 
As a result the main constraint placed on agents’ operations by the principal in each 
organisation was the imposition of budgets and financial performance targets.  This 
was a tangible method of control and easily measurable.  Keeping within budgets was 
vital in all three case study organisations, with line management performance largely 
assessed on this basis.  Combined with the intangibility of HRM, this meant that line 
                                        
2 For the purposes of this paper, line managers are defined as managers at operational level with 
functional and people management responsibilities.  
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managers’ HR responsibilities came with few formal, measurable performance 
expectations and hence a lower level of accountability:    
 
“As long as we meet the targets set by head office and keep within our 
budgets, they [Head Office] don’t really bother us too much”. (Assistant Store 
Manager, Superco) 
 
“I have a fair amount of autonomy managing the checkouts as long as the 
queues and wage bills are low” (Department Manager, Groceryco) 
 
“Employment decisions depend very much on the store management.” 
(Department Manager, Homeco) 
 
The scale of operations in the case study organisations was such that a close scrutiny 
of how budgets and performance targets were achieved within each store was often 
impractical.  As a result principals were primarily concerned with the numerical 
achievement of targets and did not closely supervise the methods used by agents to 
realise them.  The focus on outcome-based contracts in the case study organisations 
gave agents certain autonomy over detailed action, provided they produced the 
desired outcomes of meeting financial performance targets.  The intangibility of HRM 
means that it is difficult to measure every outcome and monitor standards of 
performance.  Consequently, agents in the case study stores had the opportunity to 
manipulate HR policy to enable them to meet performance targets with minimal 
detection of this transgression by principals at head office.   
 
The autonomy afforded to line managers in their execution of HR policy, together 
with the incentives offered to meet financial performance targets, encouraged the 
undermining of organisational HR policy by agents.  This manipulation led to a focus 
on hard HRM, often at the expense of the soft HR policies espoused by principals at 
head office that would focus on employees as people rather than simply resources.  A 
soft HRM approach would comprise of training, development and work-life balance 
initiatives, policies that while evident in the HR policies of all three case study 
organisations were not being fully delivered at operational level.   
 
Evidence of a hard approach to HRM and the sacrifice of soft HRM policies, 
regardless of organisational policy, was profuse across all three case study 
organisations.  Examples included the imposition of unauthorised recruitment freezes 
by agents: 
 
“Recruitment is financially controlled so you look at wage costs and look 
ahead to the budget squeeze and so you don’t recruit……………then there is 
a desperate shortage of employees and so there is a mad rush to recruit”. 
(Department Manager, Superco) 
 
This was unbeknown to head office and facilitated by the expectation that part timers 
would offer numerical flexibility through working additional shifts to cover vacancies 
while the recruitment freeze was in operation: 
 
 13 
“There is a budget problem and so we are not replacing leavers, but are using 
part timers to work overtime as a short term option until the budget comes 
under control”.  (Assistant Store Manager, Superco) 
 
This illustrates the high priority assigned to meeting financial targets by line 
managers, which at times was to the detriment of their HR responsibilities. 
 
Agents also indulged in an unofficial re-deployment of staff recruited to fulfil the 
organisations’ corporate strategy of enhanced customer service at Superco.  Principals 
at head office believed that the employment of Customer Service Assistants would 
facilitate the delivery of customer service pledges: 
 
“We’ve introduced a new role in our stores of a Customer Service Assistant.  
They’ll pack customers’ bags, load shopping into their cars, find goods for the 
customers or retrieve goods that the customer may have forgotten on reaching 
the checkouts.  This is something none of our competitors offer and will really 
put us one step ahead in terms of customer service”. (Retail Personnel 
Director, Superco) 
 
However, Customer Service Assistants were rarely used by line managers in their 
primary role of deliver ing a premium level of service to customers.  Instead they were 
often seconded to other departments, either temporarily during peak trading or 
permanently in times of staff shortages: 
 
“I was given the option of a Customer Service Assistant when a permanent 
vacancy in my department arose.  While we’re not supposed to use them in 
departments, when the store manager is trying to control budgets, it frequently 
happens”. (Department Manager, Superco) 
 
Subsequently, the store’s employee records would show these staff employed as 
Customer Service Assistants, while in practice they were often found to be working in 
other roles as and when budgets dictated.  This again demonstrates the priority placed 
on tangible performance targets by line managers when faced with the predicament of 
achieving competing priorities of customer service versus cost minimisation.  Human 
resources were manipulated and customer service provision undermined in order for 
line managers to satisfy their priority of meeting budgetary targets.   
 
Line managers held responsibility for writing staff rosters within predetermined 
budgetary limits. These staff schedules were not closely monitored by the principals 
and so provided another opportunity for line managers as agents to manipulate HR 
policy to realise short-term needs.  To compensate for the high level of discretion 
afforded to agents in this area each organisation had policies to safeguard against 
exploitation of employees and ensure compliance with employment legislation.  For 
example, line managers at Homeco were required by line managers to write staff 
schedules four weeks in advance to enable employees to plan non-work 
commitments.  However, the reality was one of staff schedules being written much 
later than company policy dictated: 
 
Comment [sjl1]: Add 
comment about this 
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“Company policy requires staff schedules to be written four weeks in advance, 
but the reality is that it’s easier to write the schedules every fortnight and so 
that’s what we do”. (Department Manager, Homeco)  
 
At Groceryco policies existed to prevent line managers changing an employee’s shift 
at short notice to ensure security of working hours for staff and prevent line managers 
exploiting employees.  In truth, greater flexibility was demanded with regular 
demands on employees by line managers to change their original scheduled hours at 
very short notice: 
 
“Official company policy is 48 hours notice of any change and then the 
employees don’t have to work it if they don’t want to.  Unofficially, we 
change their hours or get them to work extra at much less notic e”. 
(Department Manager, Groceryco) 
 
It is known that organisation of working time can be fundamental to the productivity 
and motivation of employees (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2000).  Yet even where 
policies existed in the case study organisations to safeguard employees against 
unpredictability of working hours, line managers undermined these policies and 
risked employee productivity and commitment in order to satisfy short term business 
needs.  This transcended to budget-driven management techniques which took no 
account of employees work-life balance.  The needs of the business were consistently 
cited as taking precedence over the needs of employees: 
 
“They [employees] have to fit around what the company requires and not the 
other way round.” (Department Manager, Homeco)  
 
This inevitably led to a hard approach to HRM at store level regardless of company 
HR policy that was more likely to emphasise soft HR policies.  This emphasises the 
important role of incentives in the agency contract, whereby managers were 
encouraged to prioritise economic benefits which leads them to neglect long terms 
strategies.  These soft facets of HRM were of less significance to line managers 
because their performance in this area was subject to lower levels of scrutiny and 
reward.  As a result, the delegation of HR responsibilities to line managers weakened 
corporate attempts to introduce soft HRM practices thus undermining the value and 
contribution of such policies. 
 
Another area where line managers had a large degree of discretion was in the training 
and development of their staff: 
 
“Individual departments are responsible for training”. (Store HR Manager, 
Groceryco)  
 
Groceryco attempted to introduce high commitment management practices for all 
staff through encouraging a greater emphasis on training and development: 
 
“All staff now have their own Personal Development Planner which 
encourages suggestions from employees themselves so that, in conjunction 
with their department manager, they have some input and control over their 
development and training”. (HR Manager, Head Office, Groceryco) 
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However, the priority assigned to more tangible management activities meant that line 
managers did not implement this training initiative fully: 
 
“All staff now have Personal Development Planners to improve the level and 
standards of training and development.  But we don’t have the time to sit 
down with staff to work through them, so they’re often just ignored”. 
(Department Manager, Groceryco) 
 
Where line managers were given responsibility for employee development, this 
tended to result in a hard HRM approach.  It highlights the problems of developing 
soft HR policies when increasing demands and incentives on offer to agents meant 
they considered such initiatives less relevant. 
 
The focus on outcome-based contracts and the incentives for agents being the 
fulfilment of tangible performance targets led to a dichotomy between corporate 
policy and management practice in HRM.   Agents’ attention was focused on budget-
driven management practices to the detriment of less tangible activities such as HRM 
policies.  As a result, HRM practice by agents was focused on hard HRM, regardless 
of HR strategy, which also encompassed soft HRM practices.  
 
4.2 Inter-Firm Agency Relationships: Supply Chain Management 
Taking an agency perspective, senior executives have a choice whether to adopt 
outcome or behaviour-based contracts with their retail buyers, in order to ensure that 
buyers implement and adhere to supplier relationship policies, or in the case of the 
major supermarkets, the requirements of the Code of Conduct outlined by the 
Competition Commission (2000).   Suppliers’ perceive that supermarket buyers are 
rewarded according to their ability to meet sales targets and deliver cost savings.  
 
“All they have to do is hit their targets”. 
 
“They say they want us to use a certain supplier and the reason they want us to 
use a certain supplier is because they get a rebate”.  
 
“They demand overriding discounts on total business”.  
 
Retail buyers, therefore, are typically rewarded on the basis of output, namely readily 
observed and measurable outcomes, which are not highly correlated to the desired 
action of complying with the requirements of the Code of Conduct.   Surrogate 
measures are used which focus on driving sales in stores and reducing costs of 
production, all of which potentially encourage those practices identified by the 
Competition Commission as being detrimental to the long term development of 
supplier relationships within the supply chain, in particular, requesting discounts, 
imposing charges, and transferring risks from retailer to the supplier.  According to 
theory, it is the difficulty associated with accurately measuring compliance with the 
Code of Conduct that has driven the introduction of these surrogate measur es 
designed to evaluate performance. 
 
Behaviour-based contracts attempt to reward agents on the basis of information about 
actual behaviour.  According to Agency theory, a principal can invest resources in 
 16 
management systems that increase information on an agent’s actions.  Suppliers’ 
perceptions of buyer behaviour can be viewed as one such available monitoring 
method: 
 
“It depends as much on the personality [of the Buyer] than the retailer.  We have 
had some excellent relationships and appalling relationships with the same 
retailer”. 
 
“Massive bust-ups are very rare because whatever you say, the old style 
confrontational relationship between buyer and seller has gone, and category 
management has come in”.  
 
“We work pretty hard at relationship management.  We choose the person who 
deals with the retailer carefully – must be fairly unconfrontational”.  
 
“…being generally pleasant and non-confrontational in meetings”. 
 
“…not responding to e-mails…treating suppliers with contempt”.  
 
Besanko et al, (1996) and Gibbons (1998) argue that it is the incentives offered in a 
principal-agent relationship that drives the behaviour of the agent.  The findings note 
that retail buyers are frequently moved between product categories as part of their 
professional development and consequent career progression, and that this has a 
detrimental effect on the buyer/supplier relationship.   
 
“Buyer changes are probably the fundamental reason why it is so difficult to 
deal with the supermarkets, because you get the big change of team.  All the 
work that you’ve done with them in the previous two years just goes out of the 
window”.  
 
“If you talk to any horticultural team that supplies the supermarkets, they would 
say that one of their key issues is the constant rotation of staff”. 
 
“A longer handover period could reduce problems”. 
 
In summary, and from the supplier’s perspective, buyer behaviour is a factor in the 
implementation of the Code of Practice, and the development of long-term 
relationships.  Incentives in the form of meeting sales targets, cost reductions and 
volume quotas, together with supermarket policies regarding buyer training and 
development, are identified as having a detrimental effect on some suppliers’ ability 





This paper confirms that discrepancies exist between strategy formulation and 
implementation both within firms and between firms.  It addresses the call for 
research to focus on the actual activities of line managers by examining the execution 
of HRM policies at a micro level within retail firms (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-
Mejia, 2002; Johnson et al, 2003). Any notion that strategy is routinely translated into 
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intended practice at micro level is refuted by this empirical research.  Instead there 
appeared to be a process of explicit versus implicit goals in each of the case study 
organisations that impacted on the agency contract and subsequently the 
implementation of corporate strategy.   While corporate strategy might emphasise 
long-term relationships both within firms (with employees), between firms (along the 
supply chain), and with customers, this research depicts how agents can undermine 
such goals.  The incentives for agents were focused on economic measurements of 
performance, whic h led to a focus on the short-term and the tangible concentrated 
agents’ efforts on cost minimisation.  The implicit goal of cost minimisation 
challenged any explicit intentions at principal level of long-term relationship 
development at both the intra-firm and inter-firm level and strategies focused on 
quality enhancement, as depicted in Figure 2. 
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Agency Theory can be used to explain the discrepancy between the objectives of 
principals and the behaviour of agents both at the intra-firm and inter-firm level and 
the resultant tensions between expressed strategy and actual behaviour in the case 
study organisations.  The focus on outcome based contracts and the economic 
incentives within them appeared to prioritise the activities of agents and affected both 
line managers and buyers in the same way.  It is acknowledged in management 
literature that managers can take actions that may advance their own personal self-
interest (for example, Mintzberg 1983, 1989; Hales 1993; Berry et al 1995).  While 
the agents within the case study firms had responsibility for achieving long-term 
organisational goals they had little to gain personally from this and so focused their 
efforts on those activities for which they received personal reward (for example, 
promotion, monetary rewards).  This was supported by the training provision in the 
case study organisations, which tended to focus on the more tangible responsibilities 
of agents, rather than their strategic responsibilities such as HRM and supply chain 
management.  This is perhaps symptomatic of principals’ prioritie s being focused 




firm and inter-firm level.  Consequently, the difficulty associated in measuring the 
successful implementation of employee and supplier relationship policies has led to 
surrogate measures that lead to distorted behaviour by agents who manipulate outputs 
in order to gain rewards.  
 
This paper contributes to our understanding of Agency Theory and its theoretical 
development, including the various weaknesses of Agency Theory.  The assumption 
of rationality, competence and self-interest within Agency theory is challenged by this 
research.  The management literature advocates that the pursuit of autonomy by 
managers (for example, Mintzberg 1989; Hales 1993; Ackroyd and Thompson 1999) 
plays an important role in management decision making and can therefore undermine 
the agency contract.  It is clear that agents in the case study organisations pursued the 
self-interest route and directed their behaviour towards those activities for which they 
would be personally rewarded.  This led to a short-term perspective in developing 
relationships along the supply chain and a hard approach to the management of 
human resources.  However, the findings of this paper also suggest that this is not the 
complete picture and Hendry’s (2002, 2005) notion of ‘honest incompetence’ can add 
a valuable dimension to agency theory.  Honest incompetence in the case study 
organisations could refer to the contradictory strategies of the principals who were 
demanding quality enhancement and cost minimisation simultaneously, which led to 
ambiguous contract outcomes.  In addition, agents did not appear to receive sufficient 
training and support for achieving the long-term strategy goals and so did not have the 
competence to fulfil them.  This may explain the discrepancies between formulation 
and implementation of strategy in the case study firms. 
  
Agency theory to date has concentrated on a macro-level approach, which has failed 
to examine the processes that occur both within and between firms at a more micro 
level.  As a result Agency theory has largely marginalised issues such as the 
individuality of agents (see Shaw and Gibbs 1995 for further discussion).  Different 
agents could respond in different ways to the same agency contract and large-scale 
organisations, such as those in multiple store retailing, can only exacerbate this 
problem.  In addition, a principal’s power can be limited by a geographical dispersion 
of agents and large spans of control (see Eisenhardt 1989).  This is particularly 
pertinent in multiple store retailing with its branch network of stores and complexity 
of the supply chain. 
 
The research suggests other, alternative and readily available monitoring systems that 
adopt a more subjective monitoring approach, compared to hard objective 
management information systems may offer a solution.   It also maintains that social 
and long term monetary incentives can also be offered to drive agent behaviour that 
are not purely short term financial rewards and penalties.  This research highlights the 
complexity of the agency relationship and demonstrates how agency contracts, in 
practice, run along a continuum between outcome and behaviour.  This continuum is 
determined by the actions required of the agent by the principal.  The multiplicity of 
line management responsibilities gives rise to the agent-principal relationship being 
controlled using a combination of outcome and behaviour based contracts.  In 
addition, Agency theory presumes that the principal knows precisely what action it 
requires of its agents and implicitly assumes there is no confusion.  However, this 
research shows how short term performance targets in conjunction with long term 
strategies have implications for both the execution of corporate strategy and the 
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agency relationship, within and between firms, often undermining long-term 
corporate strategies.   
 
According to Agency theory, behaviour-based contracts reward agents on the basis of 
actual behaviour, which relies on the availability of information on agent’s actions.  
This research highlights the availability of information from non-traditional sources, 
which could be utilised within behaviour -based contracts, given the incentive nature 
of monitoring systems.  Information on the behaviour of Buyers from suppliers, and 
store managers from store staff could be independently collected by a third party, and 
used in determining rewards, ie salaries and career progression. Finally, by adopting 
an interdisciplinary approach, the paper contributes to Agency theory by noting that 
contractual relationships between one dyad within the firm also have implications for 
other relationships between firms.  Supply chain management argues that competitive 
advantage comes from managing processes across the supply chain.  HRM is viewed 
by both academics and practitioners as having a narrow functional role within the 
firm.  This encourages the designing of reward systems that focus on short -term 
performance.  This research highlights the importance of taking a more strategic 
focus, and managing HRM as a process across firms in order to ensure long term 
success for all organisations within the supply chain.   
 
This paper introduces further questions about the nature of control systems, the 
agency contract and the execution of corporate strategy in multiple store retailing.  As 
retail firms become more sophisticated in their management information systems will 
we see more conformity in the behaviour of agents or will agents simply become 
more sophistic ated in their manipulation of the agency contract?  And to what extent 
are principals concerned about agents ignoring the social consequences of their 
actions if outcome-based contracts are being met?  Despite examining agency theory 
at a micro level this paper raises the issue of the predominant role of shareholders as 
major stakeholders in retail firms and until this changes economic benefits and 






Arrow, K. J. 1985. The Economics of Agency, in Principals and Agents: The Structure 
of Business. J. W. Pratt and R. J. Zeckhauser (Editors). Harvard Business School 
Press, Boston, pp 37-51.  
 
Bergen, M., S. Dutta and Walker, O. C. Jnr. (1992). Agency Relationships in 
Marketing: A Review of the Implications and Applications of Agency and Related 
Theories, in Journal of Marketing, 56 (July), pp 1-24.  
 
Berry, A.J., Broadbent J. and Otby D. (eds) (1995) Management Control: Theories, 
Issues and Practices, Basingstoke: Macmillan 
 
Besanko, D., D. Dranove and Stanley, M. (1996). Economics of Strategy.  John Wiley 
and Sons, New York. 
 
Bowen D. and Ostroff C. (2004) ‘Understanding HRM-firm performance linkages: the role of 
the “strength” of the HRM system’ Academy of Management Review, 29:2, 203-221 
 
Christopher, M. (2004). Supply Chains: A Marketing Perspectie, in Supply Chains, 
Concepts, Critiques and Futures, eds. Steve New and Roy Westbrook, Oxford 
University Press, New York, pp 23-42. 
 
Cunningham, I., James, P., and Dibben, P. (2004). Bridging the Gap between Rhetoric 
and Reality: Line Managers and the Protection of Job Security for Ill workers in the 
Modern Workplace,  British Academy of Management, Vol.15:3, pp 273-290.  
 
Competition Commission, (2000). A Summary of Supermarkets: A Report on the 
Supply of Groceries from Multiple Stores in the United Kingdom.  Available at 
www.competition-commission.org.uk/reports/446super.htm 
 
Duffy, R., Fearne, A., and Hornibrook, S. (2003). Measuring Distributive and 
Procedural Justice, British Food Journal, Vol. 105:10, pp 682-694.  
 
Fearne, A., Duffy,  R., and Hornibrook, S. (2005). Justice in UK Supermarket Buyer-
Supplier Relationships, Forthcoming, International Journal of Retail and Distribution 
Management. 
 
Eisenhardt K. (1989) Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, Academy of 
Management Review, Vol.14:1, pp 57-74 
 
Frankfort -Nachmias, C., and D. Nachmias. (1992). Research Methods in the Social 
Sciences. 4th Ed. Edward Arnold, London.  
 
Ghauri, P., K. Gronhaug, I. Kristianslund, (1995). Research Methods in Business 
Studies: A Practical Guide. Prentice Hall, New York. 
 
Gibbons, R. (1998). Incentives in Organisations. Working Paper Series: 6695, 
National Bureau of Economic Research Inc.  
 
 21 
Grabke-Rundell, A., and Gomez-Mejia, L.R. (2002). Power as a Determinant of 
Executive Compensation, Human Resource Management Review, 12 pp 3-23. 
 
Guest D. (1987) Human resource management, trade unions and industrial relations, 
Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 502-521 
 
Gunderson, M. (2001). Economics of Personnel and Human Resource Management, 
Human Resource Management Review. 
 
Hales C. (1983) Managing Through Organisation, London: Routledge 
 
Hall L. and Torrington D. (1998) ‘Letting go or holding on – the devolution of operational 
personnel activities’ Human Resource Management Journal, 8:1, 41-55  
 
Harland, C., Knight, L., and P. Cousins. (2004). Supply Chain Relationships, in 
Supply Chains, Concepts, Crit iques and Futures, eds. Steve New and Roy Westbrook, 
Oxford University Press, New York, pp 209-227. 
 
Hendry, J. 1997. An Alternative Model of Agency Theory and its Application to 
Corporate Governance. Judge Institute of Management Studies, Cambridge 
 
Hendry, J. (2002). The Principal’s Other Problems: Honest Incompetence and 
Management Contracts, Academy of Manalgement Review, 27, pp 98-113. 
 
Hendry, J. (2005). Beyond Self-Interest: Agency Theory and the Board in a Satisficing 
World, British Journal of Management, 16, pp S55-S63. 
Hendry, J. 1997. An Alternative Model of Agency Theory and its Application to 
Corporate Governance. Judge Institute of Management Studies, Cambridge. 
 
Huselid M. (1995) The impact of human resource management practices on turnover, 
productivity and corporate financial performance, Academy of Management Journal, 
38 pp 635-672 
 
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Mecklin. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in Organisational Economics. J. B. Barney 
and W. G. Ouchi (Editors). Jossey-Bass Publishers, London, pp 214-275. 
 
Johnson, G., Melin, L., and Whittington, R. (2003). Micro-Strategy and Strategising: 
Towards an Activity Based view, Journal of Management Studies, 40:1, pp 4-21. 
 
Kerr, S. 1975. On the Folly of Rewarding A, While hoping for B, in Academy of 
Management Journal, December(18), pp 769-783. 
 
Legge K. (1995) Human resource management: rhetoric and realities, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan  
 
Lusch R.F. and Jaworksi B.J. (1991) Management controls, role stress and retail 
store manager performance, Journal of Retailing, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 397-419 
 
 22 
MacDuffie J. (1995) Human resource bundles and manufacturing performance: 
organizational logic and flexible production systems in the world auto industry, 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 48 pp.199-221 
 
Marchington M. and Parker P. (1990) Changing Patterns of Employee Relations, 
London: Harvester  
 
Merchant K. (1985) Control in Business Organisations, London: Pitman 
 
Miles R. and Snow C. (1994) Fit, failure and the hall of fame.  New York: Free Press 
 
Mintzberg H. (1983) Power in and around organisations, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall 
 
Mintzberg H. (1989) Mintzberg on Management, New York: The Free Press 
 
Mitnick, B. M. 1992. The Theory of Agency and Organisational Analysis, in Ethics 
and Agency Theory. N. E. Bowie and R. E. Freeman (Editors). Oxford University 
Press, New York, pp 75-96. 
 
Naumann S. and Bennett N. (2000) ‘A case for procedural justice: Development and test of a 
multi- level model’. Academy of Management Journal, 43, 881-889  
 
New, S.J. (1997) The Scope of Supply Chain Management Research, Supply Chain 
Management: An International Journal, Vol. 12:1, pp 15-22.  
 
Ouchi W.G. (1977) The relationship between organisational structure and 
organisational control, Administrative Quarterly Weekly, Vol. 22, pp. 95-112, in 
Berry, A.J., Broadbent J. and Otby D. (eds) (1995) Management Control: Theories, 
Issues and Practices, Basingstoke: Macmillan 
 
Patterson M., West M., Lawthom R. and Nickell S. (1997) Impact of people 
management practices on performance, London, Institute of Personnel and 
Development 
 
Pfeffer J. (1994) Competitive advantage through people, Boston, Harvard Business 
School Press 
 
Renwick D. (2000) ‘HR-line work relations: a review, pilot case and research 
agenda’. Employee Relations, 22:2, 179-205 
 
Shaw, S. A. and J. Gibbs. (1995). Incentives in Distribution Channels. University of 
Strathclyde.  
 
Sparks L. (2000) ‘Employment in food retailing’ in Flexible Working in Food Retailing. Baret 
C., Lehndorff S. and Sparks L. (eds). London: Routledge 
 
Sterns, J.A., David B. Schweikhardt, H. Christopher Peterson. (1998).  Using Case 
Studies as an Approach for Conducting Agribusiness Research. Staff Paper No. 98-
11, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University. 
 23 
 
Storey J. (1989) New Perspectives in Human Resource Management, London: Routledge 
 
Storey J. (1992) Development in the management of human resources: an analytical 
review, London: Blackwell 
 
Thompson, S. (1988). Agency Costs of Internal Organisation, in Internal 
Organisation, Efficiency and Profit. S. Thompson and T. Wright (Editors). Philip 
Allain Publishers, pp 65-85.  
 
Tomlinson F., Brockbank A. and Traves J. (1997) ‘The Feminisation of Management? Issues of 
‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ in the roles and experiences of female and male managers’ Gender, 
Work and Organisation, 4: 4, 218-229 
 
Truss C., Gratton L., Hope-Hailey V., McGovern P. and Stiles P. (1997) ‘Soft and hard models 
of human resource management: a reappraisal’  Journal of Management Studies, 23:1, 53-73 
 
Weiss, M. D. (1995). Information Issues for Principals and Agents in the Market for 
Food Safety and Nutrition, in Valuing Food Safety and Nutrition. J. A. Caswell 
(Editor). Westview Press, Boulder, pp 69-79.  
 


























   
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
http://www.kent.ac.uk/kbs/research-information/index.htm 
